The balance of power in Yemen after the US-Houthi cease-fire

The May 6 cease-fire between the United States and the Tehran-supported Houthi militia in Yemen has had a consolidating effect on the balance of power inside the war-torn state and hardened the status quo of the country’s civil war. In turn, the outcome of Israel and Iran’s subsequent 12-day war has the potential to temporarily shake up this status quo once again; but Yemen’s fracturing anti-Houthi coalition is unlikely to be able to exploit that opportunity.

Last month’s halt in the high-intensity US air campaign against the Houthis, codenamed Operation Rough Rider, has played into the group’s hands, buying it time to repair infrastructure damage and reorganize its forces. In contrast, that cessation of US-Houthi hostilities may have negative consequences for the internationally recognized Yemeni government. Even more significantly, the post-cease-fire situation undermines the pro-secessionist and Emirati-backed — but formally unified with the central government — Southern Transitional Council (STC), whose forces would be the most capable of fielding a ground offensive against the Houthis, as demonstrated in the past. The STC is not only experiencing rising popular discontent in Aden and other large southern cities due to worsening economic conditions but is also seeing its influence challenged by Saudi-backed factions in the strategic Hadramout Governorate.

In terms of the security and maritime interests of the US, the consolidation of the status quo effected by the cease-fire represents a far from satisfactory scenario for Washington. While largely favorable to the Houthis — at least in the first month since May 6 — the situation has indirectly supported splits between several competing power centers in Yemen, to the detriment of a cohesive front that would have the ability to hold back, or even to significantly degrade, the ongoing threat posed by the Tehran-aligned group. The Israel-Iran war, which concluded in a fragile cease-fire on June 23, could briefly have the opposite net effect: the Houthis are likely to see a reduction in weapons provisions and other material assistance from Iran, forcing them to search for alternatives. This weakening could provide a short window of opportunity for anti-Houthi Yemeni forces to try to regain some territories from the militant group. But the timing could not be worse, given the current fragmentation of the anti-Houthi camp; and any such ground assault would be contingent on air support provided by external partners, which does not appear forthcoming.

Effect on the Houthis: Time to repair, recruit, and expand

Due to the cease-fire with the US, the Houthis, a Zaydi Shi’a movement that holds much of northwestern Yemen, can now focus on three interconnected issues, all useful to strengthen and, possibly, to extend their territorial control. First, they can work on repairing the damage caused by US and Israeli strikes on major port and airport infrastructure in Houthi-controlled areas (first and foremost, Hodeida and neighboring ports in the Red Sea along with Sanaa's international airport) to facilitate the resumption of revenue flows and weapons deliveries and reorganize and redeploy troops where necessary.

Second, they can exploit their narrative of “victory through resistance” against the US — as they did with Saudi Arabia following its 2015-22 military intervention — to further boost internal mobilization and recruitment. According to United Nations estimates, the number of Houthi fighters grew from nearly 220,000 in 2022 to 350,000 in 2024, an increase that can be attributed to a recruitment campaign named “Al-Aqsa Flood,” referencing the Hamas attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and to Israel’s subsequent war on Gaza. In this context, missile and drone strikes against Israel serve to boost the Houthis’ regional prestige in the eyes of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and are used for propaganda purposes to support continuous internal recruitment.

Third, the cease-fire could enable the Houthis to deepen an emerging strategy of “alliance diversification.” The group has achieved heightened visibility since 2023 by attacking ships in the Red Sea, threatening international trade, and then ostensibly bringing a global superpower to the table to negotiate a truce. This has made the Houthis a desirable partner to a range of players who, whether ideologically or out of strategic considerations, share their anti-Western sentiments: from Iraqi Shi’a militias, especially the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, to non-state armed actors in the Red Sea region such as al-Shabaab, to strategic competitors of the US such as Russia and China. The Houthis themselves have capitalized on this rising visibility to explore new smuggling-oriented partnerships with some of these actors, aimed at developing alternate sources and routes for weapons and financing. This diversification was originally only meant to complement the Houthis’ relationship with Iran and the rest of the Axis of Resistance; but it is likely to acquire even more strategic relevance going forward because of the consequences of the Israel-Iran war.

In the 12 days of hostilities, which began on June 12/13, Israel significantly damaged a number of Iranian weapons-storage facilities and missile-production capabilities (as it did previously during its attack on Iran in October 2024) as well as targeted its oil depots. Therefore, the Houthis now likely stand to receive fewer weapons and missiles components as well as less fuel from Iran, at least in the short to medium term. Although the Houthis have developed some homegrown weapons-assembly capabilities, they lack the capacity to produce complex weapons systems “without foreign support,” since they continue to rely on smuggled components, according to an October 2024 UN study. As such, the Houthis will now have more interest in developing new foreign partnerships — and greater urgency to do so.

Effect on Yemen’s internationally recognized government: The stalemate exacerbates economic and political crises

The internationally recognized government of Yemen based in Aden and the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), its eight-member executive body established in 2022, have much to lose in the context of the US-Houthi cease-fire. The current power balance risks further fueling internal divisions as Yemen’s economic crisis escalates, with the Saudi-backed PLC chair, Rashad al-Alimi, still unable to exercise effective leadership over all of the institutional and military arms of the state. Since the national truce between Yemen’s warring parties (including Saudi Arabia) was signed in April 2022, economic conditions have rapidly declined in government-controlled areas, aggravated by long-time mismanagement at all administrative levels. The truce is still being observed, although it formally expired in late 2022. But since October 2022, the Houthis have used the opportunity afforded by the pause in fighting to entrench and further exploit their blockade of crude oil exports through southern ports, effectively weaponizing these lost or diverted revenues against their Yemeni rivals.

The continuation of the Houthis’ blockade has severely reduced the Aden government’s income, with losses amounting to an estimated $7.5 billion (80% of revenues) since 2022. This has further delayed the payment of public salaries, worsened basic welfare services (which are also affected by cuts in food assistance from the US Agency for International Development), pushed the inflation rate above 30%, and sparked worker protests. Economic crisis-driven popular demonstrations have reached the government-held city of Taiz. Furthermore, the predicament has fueled public spats among government representatives, who blame each other for the emergency in an effort to divert attention from corruption scandals and personal power struggles. Such ineffectual bickering has an added negative impact on donor financing.

Effect on the STC: Risk of power erosion amid economic and social upheaval

The Yemeni actors in the least favorable position after the US-Houthi cease-fire are the STC along with other associated Emirati-backed forces in the south. Though the STC formally joined the central government in 2019, after signing the Riyadh Agreement, which ended their clashes in Aden, it has continued to pursue secessionist goals, with its ultimate goal being the restoration of an independent southern Yemeni state. The group has used its participation in state institutions to maximize its own economic and military power, such as by redirecting state revenues to itself from Aden’s port facilities — both the oil port (Little Aden) and the container terminals (Al Mualla) — which are under the control of the STC’s security forces along with, de facto, the rest of the capital city. But over the past several years, that source of strength has become a vulnerability.

Given that the STC had reportedly been collecting fees in Aden from imported fuel, it found itself most negatively affected by the economic and geopolitical implications of the 2022 truce. Again, this was due to the above-mentioned Houthi-imposed blockade of crude oil exports through southern ports, which has primarily hurt coastal areas controlled by the STC as well as other UAE-backed forces close to the group — Bir ‘Ali (Nushayma/Rudum oil terminal), in Shabwa Governorate, and Ash Shihr (al-Dabba oil terminal), in Hadramout. And those revenue losses to the local STC authorities have been exacerbated by the fact that, since 2017, some southern governorates had negotiated with the central government to keep 20% of the available hydrocarbon revenues for themselves. Most recently, the redirection of commercial shipments from STC-administered ports, especially Aden, to Houthi-controlled ports in the Red Sea (Hodeida, al-Salif, Ras Isa), has further strained STC finances.

In this context, popular protests have occurred in the largest southern cities held by the STC, particularly Aden and Mukalla, controlled by the Security Belt Forces and the Hadrami Elite Forces, respectively, two UAE-backed armed groups that are formally part of the security-defense apparatus but remain autonomous within it. In Aden, unprecedented women’s protests blamed both the STC and the Yemeni government for the electricity crisis, which included power outages lasting as long as 20 hours each day while temperatures soared. On May 17, Aden’s authorities banned public demonstrations in the city. And on May 24, women who were demonstrating peacefully, calling for improved living conditions, were assaulted by female recruits of the STC-affiliated security forces, highlighting the growing difficulties experienced by local powers in handling the social fallout of the economic crisis.

Effect on Saudi-backed forces: Opportunity to expand influence in southern regions

The other threat to the STC’s position is, to a certain extent, geopolitical, as the Emirati-supported group must deal with a renewed assertiveness among Saudi-backed forces in southern Yemen. As noted above, the cease-fire has reduced the prospects for a Yemeni ground offensive against the Houthis, which would have relied on the participation of all major anti-Houthi factions, crucially backed by US air cover in the form of Washington’s continued airstrikes against Houthi targets. But now, with the US formally out of the war and in the absence of an anti-Houthi campaign on the horizon, local pro-Saudi groups are left to focus on prosecuting southern rivalries, pushing for further political and military influence in areas controlled by the STC. These struggles have a wider scope that extends beyond Yemen’s borders. Since the 2022 truce, Saudi Arabia has worked to counter the interests of the STC (and its foreign sponsor, the UAE) in the south in order to regain greater influence in Yemen. It has done this in part by supporting loyalist political and military actors with anti-STC goals, including the pro-national unity Hadramout National Council as well as the National Shield Forces (NSF), operating as reserve units directly under the chair of the PLC. Riyadh has also sought to reach out to the leaderships of local tribal networks, such as the Hadrami deputy governor and tribal leader Amr bin Habrish. The Saudi strategy is designed to best position the kingdom whether or not Yemen holds together over time.

First, Riyadh ideally wants to preserve Yemen’s national cohesiveness and is backing pro-unity leaders, all to have a say in future political-institutional decisions that will affect the country as a whole; but it is also cultivating influence networks specifically in the south in case a separatist southern Yemeni state is established. Second, the Saudis aim to control the Hadrami section of Yemen’s border with the kingdom — held by the Yemeni government’s weak army — for national security reasons. Thus, not by chance, the NSF deployed forces to the oil-rich north to secure the al-Wadiah border crossing with Saudi Arabia, replacing those staffed with officers from Islah (the party comprising Muslim Brothers and Salafis).

The growing Saudi outreach to the STC's local rivals coincides with the worsening electricity crisis in Hadramout Governorate. In early February, the above-mentioned Habrish, who heads the Inclusive Hadramout Conference, the political wing of the internally divided Hadramout Tribes Alliance, deployed tribal fighters around oil fields in the north of the region, thus cutting off oil shipments for Aden’s power stations. This move, aimed at ensuring Hadrami resources remain local, temporarily intensified the electricity crisis in STC-held Aden, resulting in blackouts in the city. In March, Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman Al Saud hosted Habrish in the kingdom, marking the first reported meeting between Saudi authorities and a tribal figure who was not a formal Yemeni political leader. After the meeting, Habrish said the Saudis were “responsive” to his alliance’s political and economic demands. Back in December 2024, Habrish announced the creation of a new armed group, the Hadramout Protection Forces, and he is currently attempting to recruit fighters as well as establish armed camps in the governorate, an initiative criticized by other tribes and the STC’s forces.

Assessment: The cease-fire consolidates power balances and fuels rivalries in the anti-Houthi camp to the detriment of US security interests

When it comes to the overall balance of power of Yemeni forces, the US-Houthi cease-fire has, above all, benefited the Houthis. In the decade since the Saudi-led intervention back in 2015, and despite the more recent US bombing campaign to defeat and degrade Houthi capabilities, the Iran-backed group has demonstrated continued resilience to airstrikes and preserved its leadership intact. With the US air campaign suspended, the Houthis can focus on repairing infrastructure damage in areas they hold as well as “selling” the cease-fire to internal and regional audiences as a “victory” against the Americans. That said, in the wake of the Israel-Iran war, which has further battered their main regional benefactor’s already weakened position, the Houthis will need to concentrate harder on diversifying their sources of material support — and this may push them toward renewed aggression. In particular, if unable to find alternative sources of fuel imports to compensate for the likely reduction in smuggling from Iran, they may stage a ground offensive to seize government-held oil fields in Marib.

Last month’s cease-fire had decreased the chances of a Yemeni ground offensive against Hodeida, the main Red Sea port held by the Houthis, since success would be especially unlikely without US air cover. Conversely, the internal stalemate brought about by the US-Houthi cease-fire presents multiple dangers for the Yemeni government and, even more so, for the STC. Both now face the rapid deterioration of economic conditions in the areas they control, which were already stressed by the increase in popular protests, especially in the larger cities held by the STC.

The cease-fire thus indirectly undermines the STC, making its secessionist goals more difficult to achieve due to a combination of socio-economic crises, failing local governance, and the growing strength of rivals. Beyond the Houthis, two competing power centers will be able to capitalize on the US-Houthi cease-fire and its consolidating effect on Yemen’s internal force dynamics. The first are the political and armed groups Saudi Arabia is supporting in the southern regions, especially in Hadramout, to counter the STC. These actors can exploit the UAE-backed forces’ difficulties to expand local alliances and, possibly, to increase deployments on the ground, leveraging local grievances and autonomy aspirations. The second emboldened actor is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), for whom rising insecurity and rivalries in the south — as well as the Houthis’ promise to end its attacks on US forces — present a propaganda coup and a useful opportunity to boost recruitment. The recent video by AQAP’s leader, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, who has threatened US President Donald Trump because of the Gaza war and has called for lone wolf terrorist attacks against Gulf leaders, suggests the jihadi group may try to revitalize its position in Yemen and abroad.

Current troubles, and the worsening short- to medium-term outlook, highlight why the Emirati-backed forces were receptive in early 2025 to a Yemeni ground operation against the Houthis. The STC openly endorsed the US airstrikes; and PLC Deputy Chairman Tareq Saleh, who commands the armed group National Resistance Force, emphasized “the need for stronger support to Yemeni forces on the ground.” That renewed ground campaign, however, did not become a reality for a number of reasons: mainly due to the American reluctance to provide coordinated air cover to the Yemeni forces, but also because Operation Rough Rider proved to be more difficult than Washington expected and owing to Saudi fears of reopening a “Pandora’s box” that risked Houthi retaliation on its territory. Now, Israel is the only player still striking Houthi targets, albeit intermittently.

Against this backdrop, the US-Houthi cease-fire consolidates the power balance shaped by the 2022 truce, to the detriment of US security interests in the region. The current landscape prolongs the Houthi-imposed blockade of southern ports, eroding what remains of the institutional capacities of the Yemeni government and, especially, of the Emirati-supported STC — whose constituent forces would be the most militarily capable of pushing back the Houthis. More recently, Israel’s war against Iran significantly damaged Iranian weapons’ storage and defense-industrial facilities, suggesting the Houthis will have to cope, at least in the short term, with reduced military support from Tehran. Theoretically, this state of affairs opens up a narrow window of opportunity for Yemeni forces — especially were they to receive backing from key external partners — to exploit this temporary Houthi vulnerability and regain some territory from the group. But the current power balance, consolidated by the US-Houthi cease-fire, instead strengthens multiple and competing power centers in the anti-Houthi camp. This plays against the possibility of creating a cohesive front to significantly weaken the Houthi threat, thus prolonging both domestic and regional insecurity.

 

Eleonora Ardemagni, an analyst focused on Yemen and the GCC states, is a Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), a Teaching Assistant at the Catholic University of Milan, and an Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of Economics and International Relations-ASERI.

Photo by Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images