The Alaska Court of Appeals issued an opinion Friday declaring that the Parole Board may not deny parole solely based on the seriousness of a prisoner’s crime — such as murder — or on board members’ personal views about the appropriate sentence for a case.
James Stoneking, now 72, moved out of the home he shared with his wife, Maria, and their two young children in January 1987. About a month later, a judge ordered him not to contact Maria or return to the residence after he broke into the house.
On Feb. 14, 1987, Maria was at home with Kenneth Jensen, a man she was in a relationship with, when Stoneking drove past and saw Jensen’s car outside. He returned with a handgun, entered the house through a back window, and shot both Maria and Jensen while they sat on the couch. He told his 7-year-old daughter to go back to her room and call 911 in the morning. Before leaving through the front door, he fired more rounds into Maria and Jensen. When first responders arrived the next day, Maria was dead, and Jensen was injured.
Stoneking was sentenced to a composite 99 years for first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and first-degree burglary. His conviction was affirmed in 1990, and he has since challenged his sentence four times.
The Alaska Legislature established criteria for discretionary parole in 1985, aligning with sentencing goals. The Parole Board must determine that a prisoner will not violate the law, is rehabilitated, can reintegrate into society, does not pose a threat to the public, and that release would not diminish the seriousness of the offense.
After serving about a third of his sentence, Stoneking applied for discretionary parole in 2019. His application included his institutional record, release plan, prison job history, completed educational programs, and character references.
A probation officer recommended denying parole, citing that Stoneking had not “completely grasped the depth of his murder conviction.”
The Parole Board denied his request in 2019 and required him to serve an additional 10 years before reapplying. In a detailed letter issued that November, the board cited the “heinousness of [his] crime” and the profound impact on the victims.
Stoneking challenged the denial through a post-conviction relief application. Superior Court Judge Patricia Haines dismissed the case in April 2022, granting the state’s motion for summary disposition.
Stoneking’s attorneys, Public Defender Samantha Cherot and Assistant Public Defender Lindsey Bray, appealed the decision. They argued that the board exceeded its authority, misinterpreted the law, and made findings unsupported by substantial evidence.
The defense asserted that the board improperly emphasized Stoneking’s past crime rather than assessing his rehabilitation and suitability for safe reentry.
“In Stoneking’s case, the Board ignored its purpose and overstepped its authority by focusing on retribution and ‘how much time [was] enough time’ instead of whether he was ready for safe reentry on parole,” they wrote.
Cherot and Bray argued that the board treated parole criteria as mere guidelines and failed to explain how the record did not support Stoneking’s eligibility. They said the board’s application of the law was “muddled at best, and at worst, arbitrary.”
They also contested the board’s claim that Stoneking lacked remorse, arguing that it was based not on the parole record, but on his 2015 clemency request, a 2018 request for a parole board meeting, and a request to remove Jensen from the victim-notification list. They maintained these conclusions lacked substantial evidence.
“This issue comes down to credibility,” the defense wrote. “The Board accepted the opinion of a single lay witness—a probation officer—based on one hearsay statement, over the firsthand observations of people who had worked closely with Stoneking for years.”
They further argued that the board failed to provide Stoneking with a written plan addressing the denial’s reasoning, leaving him without guidance for improving future applications. Nor did it justify the additional 10-year wait.
Assistant Attorney General Thomas Mooney-Myers defended the board’s actions, arguing it relied appropriately on the four parole criteria and sufficiently explained its reasoning. He said there is “nothing improper” about basing a denial on a single factor, and the board had a reasonable basis for its decision.
“The Parole Board found that [Stoneking] had not yet served enough time to ensure that discretionary parole would not diminish the seriousness of his crime,” Mooney-Myers wrote. “When an applicant has not yet served enough time, the remedy is self-explanatory: the applicant must simply serve more time.”
The ACLU of Alaska, represented by attorney Susan Orlansky, filed an amicus brief in April 2023. It argued that the Parole Board systematically overemphasizes whether release would diminish the seriousness of the offense, effectively resentencing individuals based on how much time it believes is “enough.”
On Friday, the Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Haines’ ruling.
The appellate court ruled that the Parole Board cannot deny parole simply because a person was convicted of a serious crime. However, the board may consider aggravating or egregious circumstances that would make release incompatible with societal norms or disrespectful of the law.
The court found the board reasonably denied parole based on the specific facts of the crime and Stoneking’s continued failure to accept responsibility.
“Given these individualized findings, we conclude that the record establishes that the Parole Board considered the specific aggravated details of Stoneking’s offense and his lack of remorse, rather than simply basing its decision on the category of the offense,” the judges wrote.
They also affirmed that the board properly considered information from the parole progress report and clemency application and that it provided a sufficient explanation for its decision in two written letters.
The court concluded that requiring a 10-year wait before reapplying was within the board’s discretion.
“It apparently determined... that if Stoneking served an additional ten years, there would be a substantial likelihood that releasing him on parole would no longer diminish the seriousness of his offense,” the court wrote.
Chief Judge Marjorie K. Allard partially dissented, stating that the board failed to provide adequate guidance to Stoneking on how to improve future applications.
“Where I disagree with the majority is with regard to the adequacy of the Board’s guidance to Stoneking regarding what he should do to prepare a better application for discretionary parole,” she wrote.